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We study analytically a simple game theoretical model of heterogeneous interacting agents. We
show that the stationary state of the system is described by the ground state of a disordered spin
model which is exactly solvable within the simple replica symmetric ansatz. Such a stationary state
differs from the Nash equilibrium where each agent maximizes her own utility. The latter turns out
to be characterized by a replica symmetry broken structure. Numerical results fully agree with our
analytic findings.
Statistical mechanics of disordered systems provides
analytical and numerical tools for the description of com-
plex systems, which have found applications in many in-
terdisciplinary areas [1]. When the precise realization of
the interactions in an heterogeneous system is expected
not to be crucial for the overall macroscopic behavior,
then the system itself can be modeled as having ran-
dom interactions drawn from an appropriate distribu-
tion. Such an approach appears to be very promising
also for the study of systems with many heterogeneous
agents, such as markets, which have recently attracted
much interest in the statistical physics community [2,3].
Indeed it provides a workable alternative to the so called
representative agent approach of micro-economic theory,
where assuming that agents are identical, one is lead to
a theory with one single (representative) agent [4].
In this Letter we present analytical results for a simple
model of heterogeneous interacting agents, the so called
minority game (MG) [3,5], which is a toy model of N
agents interacting through a global quantity representing
a market mechanism. Agents aim at anticipating market
movements by following a simple adaptive dynamics in-
spired at Arthur’s inductive reasoning [6]. This is based
on simple speculative strategies that take advantage of the
available public information concerning the recent mar-
ket history, which can take the form of one of P patterns.
Numerical studies [3,7–9] have shown that the model dis-
plays a remarkably rich behavior. The relevant control
parameter [3,7] turns out to be the ratio α = P/N be-
tween the “complexity” of information P and the number
N of agents, and the model undergoes a phase transition
with symmetry breaking [8] independently of the origin
of information [9].
We shall limit the discussion on the interpretation of
the model – which is discussed at some length in refs. [3,7]
– to a minimum and rather focus on its mathematical
structure and to the analysis of its statistical properties
for N ≫ 1. Our main aim is indeed to show that the
model can be analyzed within the framework of statistical
mechanics of disordered system [1].
We find that dynamical steady states can be mapped
onto the ground state properties of a model very similar
to that proposed in ref. [10] in the context of optimal
dynamics for attractor neural networks. There [10] one
shows that the minimization of the interference noise is
equivalent to maximizing the dynamical stability of each
device composing the system. Conversely, we show that
the individual utility maximization in interacting agents
systems is equivalent to the minimization of a global func-
tion. We also find that different learning models lead to
different patterns of replica symmetry breaking.
The model is defined as follows [8]: Agents live in a
world which can be in one of P states. These are labelled
by an integer µ = 1, . . . , P which encodes all the informa-
tion available to agents. For the moment being, we follow
ref. [9] and assume that this information concerns some
external system so that µ is drawn from a uniform distri-
bution ̺µ = 1/P in {1, . . . , P}. Each agent i = 1, . . . , N
can choose between one of two strategies, labeled by a
spin variable si ∈ {±1}, which prescribes an action aµsi,i
for each state µ. Strategies may be “look up tables”,
behavioral rules [3,6] or information processing devices.
The actions aµs,i are drawn from a bimodal distribution
P (aµs,i = ±1) = 1/2 for all i, s and µ and they will play
the role of quenched disorder [1]. Hence there are only
two possible actions – such as “do something” (aµs,i = 1)
or “do the opposite” (aµs,i = −1). It is convenient [8]
to make the dependence on s explicit in aµs,i, introduc-
ing ωµi and ξ
µ
i so that a
µ
s,i = ω
µ
i + sξ
µ
i [11]. If agent i
chooses strategy si and her opponents choose strategies
s−i ≡ {sj, j 6= i}, in state µ, she receives a payoff
uµi (si, s−i) = −aµsi,iG(Aµ), (1)
where, defining Ωµ =
∑
j ω
µ
j ,
Aµ =
∑
j
aµsj ,j = Ω
µ +
∑
j
ξµj sj . (2)
The function G(x), which describes the market mecha-
nism, is such that xG(x) > 0 for all x so that the total
1
payoff to agents is always negative: the majority of agents
receives a negative payoff whereas only the minority of
them gain. Note that the agent–agent interaction, which
comes from the aggregate quantity G(Aµ), is of mean-
field character.
The game defined by the payoffs in Eq. (1) can be ana-
lyzed along the lines of game theory [12] by looking for its
Nash equilibria in the strategies space {sj, j = 1, . . . , N}.
Before doing this, we prefer to discuss the dynamics of
inductive agents following refs. [3,7,8]: There, the game
is repeated many times and agents try to estimate em-
pirically which of the two strategies they have is the best
one, using past observations. More precisely, each agent
i assigns a score Us,i(t) to her s
th strategy at time t, and
we assume, as in ref. [13], that she chooses that strategy
with probability [14]
πs,i(t) ≡ Prob{si(t) = s} = CeΓUs,i(t) (3)
with C−1 =
∑
s′ e
ΓUs′,i(t) and Γ > 0. The scores are
initially set to Us,i(0) = 0, and they are updated as
Us,i(t+ 1) = Us,i(t)− aµ(t)s,i G(Aµ(t))/P. (4)
The idea is that if a strategy s has predicted the right
sign i.e. if aµs,i = −signG(Aµ), its score, and hence its
probability of being used, increases. Note that aµs,iG(A
µ)
in Eq. (4) is not the payoff uµi (s, s−i) which agent i would
have received if she had actually played strategy s 6=
si(t). Indeed G(A
µ) depends on the strategy si(t) that
agent i has actually played through Aµ. Agents in the
MG neglect this effect and behave as if they were facing
an external process G(Aµ) rather than playing against
other N−1 agents. This may seem reasonable for N ≫ 1
since the relative dependence of aggregate quantities on
each agent’s choice is expected to be small. We shall see
below (see Eq. 11) that this is not true: if agents consider
the impact of their actions on Aµ, the collective behavior
changes considerably.
We focus on the linear case G(x) = x, which allows
for a simple treatment. Other choices, such as the orig-
inal one G(x) = signx, lead to similar conclusions, as it
will be discussed elsewhere [15]. With this choice, the
total losses of agents is −∑i uµi = (Aµ)2. The time av-
erage σ2 of (Aµ)2 is shown in Fig. 1, as a function of
α ≡ P/N . The system shows a complex behavior char-
acterized, among other things, by a phase transition at
αc ≃ 0.34 [8] where σ2 shows a cusp and a small α phase
where σ2 increases with Γ [13].
In order to uncover this behavior, let us focus on the
long time behavior of the dynamics. The key observation
is that, in the long run, the score of a strategy depends
on its performance in all P states. Hence, the behavior
of agents will change systematically only on time-scales
of order P . This suggests to introduce the rescaled time
τ = t/P . As P → ∞, any finite interval dτ = ∆t/P is
made of infinitely many time steps and we can use the
law of large numbers to approximate time averages with
statistical averages over the variables µ(t) and si(t) from
their respective distributions ̺µ and πs,i. We henceforth
use the notation o =
∑
µ ̺
µoµ for averages over µ and
〈·〉 for averages on si(t) and we define mi(τ) ≡ 〈si(t)〉.
With this notations, σ2 reads:
σ2= 〈A2〉 = Ω2+
∑
i
[
ξ2i +2Ωξimi
]
+
∑
i6=j
ξiξjmimj (5)
where we have used statistical independence of si, i.e.
〈sisj〉 = mimj + (1 − m2i )δi,j . The evolution of scores
Us,i in continuum time τ , is obtained iterating Eq. (4)
for ∆t = Pdτ time steps. Using Eq. (3) in the form
mi = tanh[Γ(U+1,i − U−1,i)], we find
dmi
dτ
= −2Γ(1−m2i )

Ωξi +∑
j
ξiξjmj

 . (6)
This can be easily written as a gradient descent dynamics
dmi
dτ = −Γ(1−m2i ) ∂H∂mi which minimizes the Hamiltonian
H = 〈A〉2 = σ2 −
∑
i
ξ2i (1 −m2i ). (7)
As a function of mi, H is a positive definite quadratic
form, which has a unique minimum. This implies that
the stationary state of the MG is described by the ground
state properties of H . It is easy to see [15] that H is
closely related to the order parameter θ =
√
〈signA〉2
introduced in [8], which is a measure of the system pre-
dictability [8]. Indeed H ∝ θ2 when θ is small, suggesting
that inductive agents actually minimizes predictability
rather than their collective losses σ2.
It is possible to study the ground state properties of H
in Eq. (7) using the replica method [1]. First we intro-
duce an inverse temperature β [16] and compute the av-
erage over the disorder variables Ξ = {aµs,i} of the parti-
tion function of n replicas of the system, 〈Zn〉Ξ. Next we
perform an analytic continuation for non-integer values
of n, thus obtaining 〈lnZ〉Ξ = limn→0 〈Z
n〉Ξ−1
n . The ‘free
energy’ FID = −〈lnZ〉Ξ/β depends on the the overlap
matrix Qa,b = 〈maimbi〉 (a, b = 1, ...n, a 6= b) and on the
order parameter Qa =
1
N
∑
i(m
a
i )
2, together with their
Lagrange multipliers ra,b and Ra respectively. FID can
be calculated using a saddle point method that, within
the replica symmetric (RS) ansatz Qa,b = q, ra,b = r (for
all a < b), and Qa = Q, Ra = R (for all a), leads to
FID =
α
2
1 + q
α+ β(Q − q) +
α
2β
log
[
1 +
β(Q − q)
α
]
+
β
2
(RQ − rq)− 1
β
∫
dΦ(ζ) log
∫ 1
−1
ds e−βV (s|ζ)
where V (x|ζ) = β(r−R)x22 −
√
rζx and Φ is the normal
distribution. The ground state properties of H are ob-
tained solving the saddle point equations [1] in the limit
2
β → ∞. Fig. 1 compares the analytic and numerical
findings for σ2. For α > αc = 0.33740 . . ., the solution
leads to Q = q < 1 and a ground state energy H0 > 0.
H0 → 0 as α→ α+c and H0 = 0 for α ≤ αc.
This confirms the conclusion 〈Aµ〉 = 0 ∀µ [8] (or θ = 0)
for α ≤ αc and it implies the relation
σ2 =
∑
i
ξ2i (1 −m2i ) ∼=
N
2
(1 −Q), α ≤ αc. (8)
The RS solution is stable against replica symmetry
breaking (RSB) for any α, as expected from positive def-
initeness of H . Following ref. [10], we compute the prob-
ability distribution of the strategies, which for α > αc is
bimodal and it assumes the particularly simple form
P(m) = φ(z)[δ(m− 1) + δ(m+ 1)] + z√
2π
e−(zm)
2/2 (9)
with z =
√
α/(1 +Q) (Q taking its saddle point value)
and where φ(z) = (1 − Erf(z/√2))/2 is the fraction of
frozen agents (those who always play one and the same
strategy). Below αc, P(m) is continuous, i.e. φ = 0 in
agreement with numerical findings [8].
At the transition the spin susceptibility χ =
limβ→∞ β(Q − q) diverges as α → α+c and it remains
infinite for all α ≤ αc. This is because the ground state
is degenerate in many directions (zero modes) and an
infinitesimal perturbation can cause a finite shift in the
equilibrium values of mi. This implies that in the long
run, the dynamics (6) leads to an equilibrium state which
depends on the initial conditions Us,i(t = 0). The under-
constrained nature of the system is also responsible for
the occurrence of anti-persistent effects for α < αc [8].
The periodic motion in the subspace H = 0 is proba-
bly induced by inertial terms d2Us,i/dτ
2 which we have
neglected, and which require a more careful study of dy-
namical solutions of Eqs. (3,4). It is however clear that
the amplitude of the excursion of U+1,i(t)− U−1,i(t) de-
creases with Γ, by the smoothing effect of Eq. (3). When
this amplitude becomes of the same order of 1/Γ anti-
persistence is destroyed, which explains the sudden drop
of σ2 with Γ found in ref. [13].
A natural question arises: is this state individually op-
timal, i.e. is it a Nash equilibrium of the game where
agents maximize the expected utility ui = −as,iA? One
way to find the Nash equilibria is to consider station-
ary solutions of the multi-population replicator dynamics
[17]. This takes the form of an equation for the so called
mixed strategies, i.e. for the probabilities πs,i with which
agent i plays strategy s. In terms of mi = π+,i − π−,i,
with a little algebra, these equations [17] read
dmi
dτ
= (1−m2i )
∂ui
∂mi
. (10)
Observing that ∂ui∂mi = − ∂σ
2
∂mi
, we can rewrite Eq. (10)
as a gradient descent dynamics which minimizes a global
function which is exactly the total loss σ2 of agents. Nash
equilibria then correspond to the local minima of σ2 in
the domain [−1, 1]N . The quadratic form σ2 is not posi-
tive definite, which means that there shall be many local
minima and the Nash equilibrium is not unique. It is
easy to see [15] that Nash equilibria are in pure strate-
gies, i.e. m2i = 1 ∀i, which implies σ2 = H , by Eq.
(7). A detailed characterization of the Nash equilibria
shall be given elsewhere [15]. The best Nash equilibrium
can be studied applying the replica method to σ2 for
β →∞. The multiplicity of Nash equilibria (meta-stable
states) manifests itself in the occurrence of replica sym-
metry breaking for any α > 0 with a non-vanishing σ2/N
[15]. The simple RS solution, though incorrect, provides
a close lower bound F
(RS)
NE = FID+
1
2 (1−Q) to σ2/N for
β → ∞ (see Fig. 1). For α > 1/π, we have Q = q = 1
and F
(RS)
NE (β = ∞) = [1 − 1/
√
πα]2 positive, whereas
1 = Q < q and F
(RS)
NE = 0 for α < 1/π.
Fig. 1 shows that in a Nash equilibrium agents perform
way better than in the MG. This is the consequence of
the fact that agents do not take into account their impact
on the market (i.e. on Aµ) when they update the scores
of their strategies by Eq. (4). It is indeed known [18]
that reinforcement-learning dynamics based on Eq. (3)
is closely related to the replicator dynamics and hence
it converges to rational expectation outcomes, i.e. to
Nash equilibria. More precisely, ref. [18] suggests that
this occurs if Eq. (4) is replaced with
Ui,s(t+ 1) = Ui,s(t) + u
µ(t)
i (s, s−i(t))/P (11)
Now Us,i(t) is proportional to the cumulated payoff that
agent i would have received had she always played strat-
egy s (with other agents playing what they actually
played) until time t. As Fig. 1 again shows this leads to
results which coincide with those of the Nash equilibrium.
It is remarkable that the (relative) difference between
Eqs. (4) and (11) is small, i.e. of order 1/Aµ ∼ 1/√N .
Yet, it is not negligible because, when averaged over all
states µ it produces a finite effect, specially for α < αc
and it affects considerably the nature of the stationary
state. This term has the same origin of the cavity re-
action term in spin glasses [1]. In order to follow Eq.
(11) agents need to know the payoff they would have re-
ceived for any strategy s they could have played. That
may not be realistic in complex situations where agents
know only the payoffs they receive and are unable to dis-
entangle their contribution from G(Aµ). However agents
can account approximately for their impact on the mar-
ket by adding a cavity term +ηδs,si(t) to Eq. (4) which
“rewards” the strategy si(t) used with respect to those
s 6= si(t) not used. The most striking effect of this new
term, as discussed elsewhere [15] in detail, is that for
α < αc an infinitesimal η > 0 is sufficient to cause RSB
and to reduce σ2/N by a finite amount.
3
So far, the information µ(t) was randomly and inde-
pendently drawn at each time t form the distribution
̺µ = 1/P . In the original version of the MG [3] µ is
instead endogenously determined by the collective dy-
namics of agents: µ(t) indeed labels the sequence of the
last M = log2 P “minority” signs – i.e. µ(t + 1) =
[2µ(t) + 1]mod P if A
µ(t) > 0 and µ(t+ 1) = [2µ(t)]mod P
otherwise. The idea [3] is that the information refers
to the recent past history of the market, and agents try
to guess trends and patterns in the time evolution of the
process G(Aµ(t)). We may say that µ(t) is endogenous in-
formation, since it refers to the market itself, as opposed
to the exogenous information case discussed above.
Numerical simulations [9] show that the collective be-
havior of the MG – based on Eq. (4) – under endoge-
nous information is the same as that under exogenous
information. Within our approach, the relevant feature
of the dynamics of µ(t) is its stationary state distribu-
tion ̺µ. The key point is that a finite fraction 1 − φ of
agents behave stochastically (m2i < 1) because Q < 1.
As a consequence, Aµ has stochastic fluctuations of or-
der
√
N(1−Q) which are of the same order of its average
〈Aµ〉 ∼
√
H . With endogenous information, these fluctu-
ations of Aµ induce a dynamics of µ(t) which is ergodic in
the sense that typically each µ is visited with a frequency
̺µ ≃ 1/P in the stationary state [15]. The situation
changes completely when agents follow Eq. (11). Indeed
the system converges to a Nash equilibrium where agents
play in a deterministic way, i.e. m2i = 1 (or Q = φ = 1).
The noise due to the stochastic choice of si by Eq. (3)
is totally suppressed. The system becomes deterministic
and the dynamics of µ(t) locks into some periodic or-
bit. The ergodicity assumption then breaks down: Only
a small number P˜ ≪ P of patterns µ are visited in the
stationary state of the system, whereas the others never
occur (̺µ = 0). This leads to an effective reduction of the
parameter α → α˜ = P˜ /N , which further diminishes σ2.
Numerical simulations show that P˜ ∝ √P which imply
that α˜→ 0 in the limit P = αN →∞, i.e σ2/N → 0.
In summary we have shown how methods of statis-
tical physics of disordered systems can successfully be
applied to study models of interacting heterogeneous
agents. Our results extend easily to more general models
[15] and, more importantly, the key ideas can be applied
to more realistic models of financial markets, where het-
erogeneities arise e.g. from asymmetric information.
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FIG. 1. σ2/N versus α = P/N for P = 26 for inductive
dynamics (full squares), for the numerical minimization of
Eq. (7) (open squares), corrected inductive dynamics (full
diamonds) and the ground state of σ2 (open diamonds). The
full and the dashed lines are the corresponding analytic re-
sults. Averages are taken over 200 realizations.
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